We consider how past, current, and future competition within an elimination tournament a §ect the probability that the stronger player wins. We present a two-stage model that yields the following main results: (1) a shadow e §ectóthe stronger the expected future competitor, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage and (2) an e §ort spillover e §ectóprevious e §ort reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. We test our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover e §ects ináuence match outcomes and have been already been priced into betting markets.
Competition for employment and education, innovation funding, and design opportunities can all be framed as multi-stage elimination tournaments in which players are knocked out over successive stages of the event. These contests are often designed to increase player e §ortóindeed, much of the theoretical and empirical literature focuses on contests as incentive mechanisms. Yet, tournaments may also serve as selection mechanisms, identifying the ìbestî candidates as overall winners. In labor tournaments where employeesí latent talents are not directly observable, Örms may organize contests to reveal their workersí relative abilities. 1 In this paper, we study how the strategies of heterogeneous players in match-pair elimination tournaments are shaped by past, current, and future competition. More speciÖcally, we examine how these intertemporal e §ects ináuence a tournamentís ability to reveal the strongest player as the winner. Past exertion may make current e §ort more costly and may depress performance, and the shadow of tough future competition decreases a playerís expected future payo §s and may also lead to lower current e §ort. The di §erential impact of past and future competition across players in a given match changes the e §ectiveness of tournaments as a selection mechanism. We Önd that both past exertion and tough future competition increase the probability that a weak candidate wins.
Our results have practical implications; whether the contestís objective is to encourage e §ort, select a strong winner, or both, we Önd evidence suggesting that Örms, educators, and other contest designers may need to consider the role of past and future competition in structuring incentives.
In personnel tournaments, workers risk elimination as they advance through corporate management levels. In most contexts, retention of the highest quality worker is most desirable. For example, GEís former CEO, Jack Welch, designed an explicit elimination tournament to select his successor (Konrad 2009 ). Competition between Örms may also be knockout events. In 2010, GE announced a three-stage elimination tournament, the Ecomagination Challenge, to award $200 million to the Örm that developed the best smart grid technologies. More commonly, architectural Örms may compete for large contracts and investment banks may compete for new clients over several elimination stages. Political races also may involve eliminationóa candidate must win his partyís primary election to compete in the general election to hold o¢ce. Many sporting events are also structured as elimination tournaments.
In each of these examples, e §ort is clearly important; Örms want to hire managers, designers, bankers and innovators who will invest heavily in the activity at hand, voters want their representatives to work hard on their behalf, and spectators enjoy high action games. However, selection may also be a prime objective of the contest organizeróa client may desire the most creative design Örm, voters may value the most skilled politician, and a board may want the smartest executive to lead the company.
We explore elimination tournaments as selection mechanisms with a two-stage match-pair model. One particular strength of our model is that its predictions are framed in terms of outcomes. As a result, they are testableóin contrast with e §ort that is notoriously di¢cult to measure in the Öeld, tournament wins and losses are readily observable. We test our theoretical predictions using the outcomes of high-stakes matches; we exploit the random assignment of players in professional tennis tournament draws. Examining the e §ect of changes in the skill of the expected competitor in the next round, we Önd strong evidence of a shadow e §ect. In addition, spillover in tennis tournaments appears to have a particularly negative impact on the stronger player. We also examine tennis betting markets and Önd that bookmakersí prices reáect both spillover from past competition and the shadow of future opponents.
The literature on the type of tournament that we studyósometimes called ìknock-outî tournamentsóbegins with Rosenís (1986) model of a multi-stage contest where players have Tullock-style (1980) contest success functions. One signiÖcant di §erence between Rosen (1986) and our current paper is that we use the contest success function that appeared earlier in Lazear and Rosen (1981) . More importantly, Rosen (1986) is not focused on shadow and spillover e §ects; instead, his main result explains the skewed compensation distributions found in many Örms. Harbaugh and Klumpp (2005) study a special case of Rosenís model with a single prize and introduce a version of spillover. In contrast to our result that e §ort in the Örst stage has a relatively larger impact on the stronger playerís probability of success, they model a contest in which low-skill players are disadvantaged in the Önal round. This result is generated by a set of assumptions that di §ers from those in our model; in particular, Harbaugh and Klumpp assume that e §ort is costless and therefore completely exhausted in the Önal stage, and the total supply of e §ort is Öxed and equal for all players. In their set-up, the stronger player conserves his e §ort in anticipation of sti § competition in a Önal stage match against an equally skilled opponent, whereas the weaker player always exerts more e §ort than the stronger player in the Örst stage. The weaker playerís Örst-stage exertion ìspills overî into the next stage and further reduces his chance of winning the event.
Our e §ort spillover prediction also relates to previous work on fatigue in dynamic competition. Ryvkin (2011) presents a winner-take-all model where homogeneous players face a binary e §ort decision and e §ort has no explicit costóthese features are in stark contrast to our model where players are heterogeneous and e §ort is a continuous and costly choice variable in a multi-prize tournament. In his work, fatigue accumulates across stages and players have no opportunity to refresh their e §ort resources. Among other results, he Önds that equilibrium e §ort is decreasing in fatigueósimilar to our notion of negative spillover between tournament stages. Schmitt et al. (2004) study the opposite phenomenonópositive spilloveróin rent-seeking contests. They Önd both theoretical and experimental evidence that positive spillover leads to more Örst-period expenditure. Our contribution complements and extends these theoretical and experimental results to the Öeld. Moreover, we consider the shadow of expected future competition in addition to the impact of spillover from the past.
Related to our interest in the e §ect of future competitor, Ryvkin (2009) considers the elasticities of a playerís equilibrium e §ort with respect to the abilities of his opponents across several tournament formats. In elimination tournaments with weakly heterogeneous players, he Önds that the abilities of opponents in the more distant future have a lower impact on a playerís equilibrium e §ort than does the ability of the current opponent. While Ryvkin (2009) focuses on playersí e §ort, we are particularly concerned with tournament outcomes.
Several papers have explored the use of tournaments as a selection mechanism. Searls (1963) compares the statistical properties of single-and double-elimination contests and predicts that single-elimination eventsóthe type of tournament that we consider in this paperóare most likely to select the highest ability player as the winner. While our model allows players to make strategic e §ort decisions in response to past and future competition, Ryvkin and Ortmann (2008) and Ryvkin (2010) compare the selection e¢ciency of three tournament formats when contestants do not choose e §ort. In these models, as in the one that we present in the text below, a playerís success is probabilistic. In contrast, Groh et al. (2012) model an environment in which heterogenous players choose their level of e §ort but participate in a perfectly discriminating contest. In an all-pay auction, they explicitly consider various contest designerís objectives, including selection. They Önd that common seeding rules that match weakest to strongest players in the semiÖnals maximize the probability that the strongest player wins overall. Riis (2001, 2007) also examine one-stage, perfectly discriminating contests and explore how various prize rules can improve selection. Modeling a di §erent type of strategic choice, Hvide (2002) , Cabral (2003) , Hvide and Kristiansen (2003) study outcomes in contests in which competitors choose their degree of risk taking.
Of course, a tournamentís ability to select the best is only important when contest designers face a Öeld of heterogeneous competitors. Empirically, Sunde (2009) tests the incentive e §ect of player heterogeneity in professional tennis tournaments. He Önds that heterogeneity impacts the e §ort choice of the stronger player more than it changes the e §ort of the weaker player in a match; for an equal change in rank disparity, the increase in the number of games won by the stronger player is smaller than the decrease in the number of games lost by the weaker player. In addition to the concurrent heterogeneity studied in Sundeís work, we also examine heterogeneity across multiple stages of an event, exploring the incentive impact of ability di §erences with past, current, and (expected) future opponents. The e §ects of player heterogeneity on e §ort in one-shot tournaments has been studied both theoretically (e.g. Baik 1994; Moldovanu and Sela 2001; Szymanski and Valletti 2005; Minor 2011 ) and empirically (e.g. Knoeber and Thurman 1994; Brown 2011 ).
The paper is organized as follows: Section 1 presents a two-stage model of an elimination tournament. We derive several propositions and outline the testable hypotheses. In Section 2, we describe our data and empirical strategy for testing these predictions. Section 3 describes the results from past tournaments and discusses the spillover and shadow e §ects in the context of betting markets. We conclude in Section 4 and discuss the implications of our Öndings for contest designers.
Theory
We study a theory of knockout tournaments in which matches within a given stage are staggered over time. Players in later matches learn the identity of their potential future opponent from outcomes of earlier matches. However, players in these earlier events can only form expectations about their future opponent. This formulation captures both sequential and simultaneous features of competitionójust as players in simultaneous matches must form expectations about the outcomes of parallel games, so too must players in early matches of sequential tournaments form expectations about later matches.
This tournament format is often found in practice. For example, in Örms, simultaneous promotions to division vice-president may be rare. Instead, the identity of the new appointee is known to other workers still competing for a parallel executive spotóthe hopeful workers now know their future opponent for further advancement. This structure is in contrast with other models of elimination tournaments where all matches in a given stage occur simultaneously rather than sequentially (for example, see Stracke (2011)) or all participants compete against each other simultaneously in pools, rather than as pairs (Fu and Lu 2012) . We use an additive noise model, as in Lazear and Rosenís (1981) foundational work on oneshot labor tournaments, to focus on the dynamics of a multi-stage elimination tournament. 2 In the following section, we explore the role of past and future competition on tournament outcomes. We present a model that is simple enough to clearly inform our empirical tests, yet rich enough to capture common features of high-stakes, multi-stage tournaments. Specifically, we model an elimination tournament with heterogeneously skilled players competing in sustained competitionóone could imagine professionals of varying abilities competing over months or years for a prized position within the Örm. 3 For expositional ease, we Örst present the spillover and shadow e §ects separately in Section 1.2 and 1.3. Then, in Section 1.4, we present an analysis of the e §ects operating simultaneously and also enrich the notion of cross-round spillover.
Our theory results describe the probability that the stronger player wins in di §erent stages of the elimination event. These predictions speak directly to our broader research question of ìselecting the best.î That is, our comparative statics results provide predictions about when the strongest player is most likely to advance to future rounds of competition and, ultimately, win the tournament.
Model Set-Up
Consider a two-stage elimination tournament with four risk-neutral players, where the players who win in the Örst stage advance to the Önal stage. The overall tournament winner receives a prize of V W ; while the second-place competitor receives a prize V L . Let V W > V L > 0 and deÖne the prize spread "V = V W "V L : For simplicity, we assume no discounting across stages. Let player iís total cost be a quadratic function of his e §ort x i and his cost type c i : 4 The convexity assumption on the cost function is common in the literature on tournaments and captures the notion that additional units of e §ort are increasingly costly for competitors. 5 For simplicity, we denote a playerís cost function as 1 2 x 2 and a player iís total cost as c i 1 2 x 2 i . We assume that cost types, c i , vary across all players and are commonly known amongst competitors. 6 We will describe players with relatively low costs as being ìstrongerî than players with relatively high costs. 3 In a sports context, our model better reáects the dynamics of an endurance event (e.g. tennis) than competition requiring short bursts of e §ort (e.g. powerlifting). 4 One could deÖne a mapping E : R N + ! R 1 + that collapses levels of N e §ort-generating activities to the real line. The overall cost of e §ort is then strictly increasing in the resultant scalar x i . 5 Our results hold for more general convex cost functions, $ (x i ), provided that both playersí e §ort choices are su¢ciently sensitive to a change in marginal beneÖt. In particular, we require that
: Versions of the model with linear and other quasi-convex costs also produce similar results. 6 For ease of exposition, we model heterogeneity through playersí cost types. However, several alternative models produce identical results: for example, we can also capture heterogeneity across valuations by deÖning a playerís valuation of the prize as V ci or allow the impact of an additional unit of e §ort on the probability of winning to vary across competitors. It can also be shown that capturing heterogeneity by varying cost function convexity leads to similar results.
Recall that matches in the Örst-stage are sequential. Assume that players 3 and 4 compete Örst. Then, player 1 faces player 2 knowing the outcome of the previous match. Players 3 and 4 will form an expectation of the strength of future competition, knowing only the identity of two potential opponents. Without loss of generality, we assume that player 3 won his match against player 4.
Final Stage of the Tournament
Assume that player 1 won his Örst-stage match. To Önd the equilibrium of the multi-stage game, we begin by analyzing the strategies of player 1 and his opponent player 3 in the Önal stage. DeÖne player 1ís expected payo § function as
where his probability of winning takes the following form:
where x i + " i is player iís level of output and output is a function of both e §ort x i and a random noise term " i : In deÖnition (2) ; the probability that player 1 wins is increasing in his own e §ort and decreasing in the e §ort of his opponent. DeÖne " = " 3 " " 1 and let " be distributed according to some distribution G such that probability (2) can be written as
Now, player 1ís payo § function (1) can be written as
and his Örst order condition is
Following Konrad (2009) 
The assumption that G is uniformly distributed removes the strategic interdependence of playersí current period e §ort choices (Konrad 2009 ). 8 This allows us to isolate the consequences of past e §ort choices and potential future competition on current-stage e §ort. In a Örm context, this would assume that a workerís optimal e §ort choice is independent of the identity of his current opponent; of course, in earlier stages, his optimal e §ort depends on his expectations about future opponentsí identities. The results hold broadly if we relax this assumption of same-stage independence and allow playersí optimal e §ort choices to depend on both their current and future opponents. 9 Rewriting the Örst order condition (5) yields:
which we can rearrange as the following expression:
Assume for the remainder of the analysis that player 1 is the stronger player (c 1 < c 3 ) : Then, expression (6) implies that player 1 exerts more e §ort in the Önal stage (x " 1 > x " 3 ). Therefore, the stronger player is more likely to win in the Önal stage, relatively to his weaker opponentóthat is, the better player is more likely to be ìselectedî as the overall tournament winner.
In the Önal round, since both players are guaranteed at least the second prize V L ; only the di §erence between Örst and second prize matters to competitors. As expected, a larger 7 To ensure that probabilities are well-deÖned, we require that
This condition ensures that G(%) 2 (0; 1): 8 Results from Ryvkin (2009) support this simplifying assumption. He shows that, when playersí relative abilities are uniformly distributed, a ìbalancedî seeding can eliminate the dependence of a playerís equilibrium e §ort on his opponentís ability. 9 A version of the model with more general distribution that allow for same-stage interdependence, including the normal distribution, is available in Brown and Minor (2014) .
prize spread leads to more e §ort from both players, though the stronger player increases his e §ort more than the weaker player. Also, increasing the noise around e §ort (i.e., increasing a; the width of the support of G) reduces e §ort, particularly for the stronger player.
First Stage of the Tournament
DeÖne z 1 and z 2 as the e §orts of players 1 and 2 in the Örst stage. Player 1ís expected payo § function in the Örst stage is
whereṼ 1 is his continuation value (i.e., his payo § in the Önal stage):
yields the Örst order condition
which we can rearrange, for either player, as the following expression:
Fixing a playerís continuation value, his e §ort z " i is decreasing in c i . Since the continuation value itself is also decreasing in c i ; Örst-stage e §ort z " i is increasing in a playerís ability (decreasing in c i ). 10 Recall that, at the start of their match, players 1 and 2 already know the outcome of the other Örst-stage match between players 3 and 4. Of course, this means that players 3 and 4 did not know exactly the identity of their future opponent. Instead, we assume that they formed an expectation of their continuation value as follows:
2 ) for i = 3; 4 10 It can be shown, using expression (9) ; that
where p 1ji is the equilibrium probability that player 1 wins knowing that he will face player i in the Önal stage. 11 Note that player i cannot ináuence this probability p 1ji because it is a function of the realized outcome of the completed match between players 3 and 4. This simpliÖes our analysis, since player iís Örst-stage e §ort z i does not change this probability p 1ji : Thus, for players 3 and 4, we can express their e §ort as
and the analysis described above for players 1 and 2 applies similarly.
Shadow of Future Competition
We can use the model to understand the impact of known or expected future competition on the likelihood that stronger players advance to future stages of the tournamentóof course, this then ináuences the likelihood that a high-skill player is selected as the overall winner.
Consider an increase in the skill of the future opponent. This change has the e §ect of decreasing the continuation value for both players 1 and 2 in the Örst stage. In the following analysis, we show that if player 1 has a lower cost of e §ort than player 2, then he will decrease his Örst-stage e §ort more than player 2.
We can express player iís Örst-stage e §ort as
To identify the e §ect of a change in the e §ort cost of the future opponent, we take the derivative @z "
Thus, an increase in the skill of the future opponent (i.e. a decrease in c 3 ) decreases a playerís e §ort in the Örst stage. This is consistent with Ryvkin (2009) who Önds that, in tournaments with weakly heterogeneous players, e §ort depends negatively on future opponentsí skill levels.
Since we are additionally concerned with tournament outcomes, we next ask: Which Örst-stage player is more sensitive to the change in the future competition? Let c 1 < c 2 : Then, @z "
When player 1 is stronger than player 2,
This means that, for a given increase in the talent of the future competitor, player 1 decreases his e §ort even more than player 2. This gives us the Örst proposition:
Proposition 1 As the skill of the future competitor in the Önal stage increases (declines), the stronger player becomes less (even more) likely to win in the Örst stage and thus less (even more) likely to be selected as the overall tournament winner. Figure 1 provides some intuition for the result. Marginal cost and beneÖt are presented on the vertical axis and e §ort is shown on the horizontal axis. By deÖnition, the marginal cost of the weaker player lies above the marginal cost of the stronger competitor. In the model, the marginal beneÖt of e §ort is always larger for the stronger player; however, for simplicity in the Ögure, we make the conservative assumption that both players enjoy the same marginal beneÖt of e §ort. When the marginal beneÖt of e §ort is low, the di §erence between the stronger and weaker playersí e §orts is E §ortGap Low and when the marginal beneÖt of e §ort is high, the di §erence is E §ortGap High : When the future competitor is more skilled, both of the current players experience a decrease in their marginal beneÖt of e §ort, a move from MB High to MB Low : Since E §ortGap High > E §ortGap Low ; players facing a more skilled opponent provide more similar levels of e §ort, and this reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. The reverse is true as the future competitor becomes less skilled; in this case, the gap between current playersí e §orts increases and this improves the stronger playerís chance of success.
A limit argument is also illustrative. Consider a current stage with two di §erently-skilled players, where the winner advances to face some Önal typical opponent. Given his superior skills, the stronger player is more likely to win in the current stage. Now, consider what happens when the next round competitor is impossible to beat: Both players in the current stage will exert almost no e §ort. This hurts the chances of the stronger player, since his likelihood of winning declines towards 50%. In contrast, the weaker player in the current stage sees his probability of success improve towards 50%. The prospect of an impossibly strong future opponent turns the current match into a coin-áip and, as a result, reduces the chances that the stronger player wins. Similar intuition applies to the case where the future competitor changes from unbeatable to typical.
E §ort Spillover
We can also examine e §ort spillover between stages of the tournament. Spillover can take either a positive or negative form. Positive spillover might reáect learning-by-doing, skill building or momentum within a Örm. For example, an innovation team whose proposal advances to a second stage of funding might beneÖt from its Örst-stage experiences, both technical and relational. With positive spillover, second-stage e §ort is less costly than Örst stage e §ort. In contrast, negative spillover might reáect fatigue or reduced resources in later stages. For example, architects competing in design competitions might exhaust their creative resources in early stages and have only limited energy for second-stage proposals. In this case, second-stage e §ort is more costly than Örst-stage e §ort. 12 Consider a scenario where e §ort expended by a player in the Örst stage ináuences his marginal cost of e §ort in the Önal stage. 13 We can rewrite player 1ís Önal-stage payo § as
where k reáects the change in total cost induced by Örst stage e §ort.
To study a negative spillover e §ect, we let a playerís marginal cost of e §ort in the Önal stage increase (k > 1) and Önal stage e §ort is strictly decreasing in the degree of negative spillover. With positive spillover, a playerís marginal cost of e §ort in the Önal stage decreases (k < 1) and Önal stage e §ort is increasing in positive spillover. Now, equilibrium e §ort is
Straightforward calculations show that negative (positive) spillover reduces (increases) a playerís Önal-stage payo §. Consequently, Örst-stage e §ort decreases (increases) with negative (positive) spillover. Thus, negative spillover implies a lower probability of success in the Önal stage, holding the opponentís e §ort and skill constant. Of course, the opposite is true for positive spillover. Since @x "
3 @k when both players in a match su §er similar negative spillover, the stronger player is more adversely a §ected. As a result, he is relatively less likely to win. In the limit, G (x " 1 " x " 3 ) ! 0:5 as the degree of negative spillover k ! 1:
We summarize this Önding in the second proposition:
Proposition 2 A common proportional increase in e §ective cost type decreases the probability that the stronger player wins. Figure 2 illustrates the spillover e §ect. For both players, negative spillover increases the marginal cost of e §ort and reduces the levels of e §ort exerted in the competition. However, a common proportional increase in marginal cost leads to a larger change in e §ort for the stronger player, relative to the weaker player. Since E §ortGap W ithoutSpillover > E §ort-Gap W ithN egativeSpillover ; players experiencing negative spillover provide more similar levels of e §ort, and this reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage.
Again, a limit argument provides further intuition. Consider a current stage with two players who experience typical levels of negative spillover. Given his superior skills, the stronger player is more likely to win in the current stage. Now, consider what happens when spillover increases dramatically. Facing very high costs, both players will exert similarly low levels of e §ort. This hurts the chances of the stronger player, since his likelihood of winning declines towards 50%. In contrast, the weaker player in the current stage see his probability of success improve towards 50%. Thus, negative spillover evens the playing Öeld.
Proposition (2) suggests that, with negative spillover, weaker players might support costlier competitive conditionsófor example, a weaker player might advocate for more stringent common standards or more di¢cult tasks. Overall, however, the direction and impact of spillover depends on the context and, thus, is an empirical question.
Our result that negative spillover levels the playing Öeld in both stages is in contrast to Harbaugh and Klumppís (2005) Önding that intertemporal tradeo §s level the playing Öeld for the Örst stage, but do the opposite in the Önal stage. Their result is sensitive to the assumptions that e §ort is costless and that playersí total e §orts are equally constrained.
Spillover need not be modeled as a common proportional increase in marginal cost; in the next section, we allow the degree of spillover to be a function of Örst stage e §ort and achieve similar results.
Combined Shadow and Spillover E §ects
In the text above, we separately present the models of e §ort spillover and the shadow of future competition; now, we consider these e §ects simultaneously and allow spillover to be an increasing function of Örst-stage e §ort. Combining the e §ects does not change the general predictions of the previous analysisóthe prospect of a stronger future competitor and the presence of negative spillover continue to even the playing Öeld.
Spillover and Shadow -Final Stage
Under this formulation, our Örst order condition for the Önal stage yields equilibrium e §ort choice
where k (%) reáects the degree of spillover from the previous stage and is a strictly increasing function of Örst stage e §ort z i . As expected, greater Örst-stage e §ort results in lower e §ort in the Önal stage. Further, this e §ect is ampliÖed for the stronger type since c 1 < c 2 : The Önal stage spillover e §ect is @x "
@k(z 2 ) < 0; a common level of spillover reduces the disparity between participantsí e §orts in the Önal stage, since @x ! 1 @k(z 1 ) < @x ! 2 @k(z 2 ) < 0: As a result, the stronger player is less likely to win in the Önal stage.
Spillover and Shadow -First Stage
Next, we consider e §ort decisions in the Örst stage. We write k (z i ) as k i to simplify the notation in this section and express player iís payo § as
The Örst order condition for the Örst stage is
which then gives us the following expression for Örst-stage equilibrium e §ort:
,
With no spillover, the left term is the shadow e §ect that we described in Section 1:2. Again, the stronger player becomes less likely to win in the Örst stage as the skill of the future competitor increases.
The right term reáects spillover. Consider the e §ect of introducing spillover. Since G first (%) ) 1 2 and c 1 < c 2 ; the negative spillover e §ect is greater in magnitude for the stronger player. This increases the chances that the weaker player wins; thus, spillover has the e §ect of evening the playing Öeld. That is, ceteris paribus, spillover increases the chance of an upset.
Model Predictions
The theory model outlined above provides the following main predictions:
1. Shadow of Future Competitors: The stronger the expected competitor in the next stage, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage. Empirically, for a given pair of competitors, we expect that the stronger player is less likely to win when the winner of the current match will face a stronger future opponent.
2. E §ort Spillover between Stages: Increased negative (positive) spillover decreases (increases) the probability that the stronger player wins in the Önal stage. Empirically, for a given pair of competitors experiencing negative spillover, we expect that similar levels of past exertion will make it less likely that the stronger player wins.
Although not the focus of the current paper, other predictions follow immediately from our analysis: (a) a steeper prize structure improves the stronger playerís probability of success in all stages; (b) the noisier the e §ort-to-output relationship, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in either stage; and (c) Öxing the competitorsí abilities and given a su¢ciently large (small) second-place prize, the weaker playerís probability of winning is greater (smaller) in the Önal stage, relative to the Örst stage. Proofs for these additional results are available from the authors by request.
Note that the modelís main implications are framed in terms of outcomes, allowing us to readily test these predictions by observing tournament winners. In the following sections, we describe our data and empirical analysis.
Data
Professional tennis o §ers an ideal environment in which to test the empirical implications of the theory. 14 Tennis events are single-elimination tournamentsóonly winning players advance to successive stages until two players meet in the Önal stage to determine the overall winner. Prizes increase across stages with the largest prize going to the overall winner, and the distribution of prizes is known in advance for all tournaments. The Önancial stakes are substantial and vary across eventsófor example, the total purse for the 2009 US Open singles competition was $16 million with a $1.7 million prize for Örst place, while the total purse for the 2009 SAP Open was $531,000 and the winner received $90,925.
Our empirical analysis exploits the random nature of the initial tournament draw. By ATP rules, the top 20 to 25% of players in an event (the ìseedsî) are distributed across the draw: the top two seeds are placed on opposite ends of the draw; the next two seeds are randomly assigned to interior slots on the draw; the next four seeds are randomly assigned to other slots; etc. After the seeded players have been assigned, the remaining players are then randomly placed in matches prior to the start of the event. This variation provides the identiÖcation for our empirical approachówe can observe the same skilled player compete against a variety of randomly-assigned opponents. For example, in our data, we can observe the fourth best player in the world play against competitors ranked 50 th , 100 th , and 250 th in the Örst round of the same tournament over di §erent years. 15 The structure of tennis tournaments is particularly conducive to studying the shadow of future competitionóboth players (and the econometrician) know the competitors in the parallel match. In some cases, players know exactly who they would face in the next round; in other cases, they can make reasonable predictions about upcoming opponents. Measures of playersí abilities are also observable to competitors and researchersópast performance data, as well as world rankings statistics, are widely available.
Data from professional tennis has been used in other research: Walker and Wooders (2001) used video footage and data from the Önals of 10 Grand Slam events to identify mixed strategies. Malueg and Yates (2010) study best-of-three contests using four years of data from professional tennis matches with evenly-skilled opponents. They Önd that the winner of the Örst set of a match tends to exert more e §ort in the second set than does the loser and, in the event of a third set, players exert equal e §ort. Forrest 
Professional Tennis Match Data
To test the predictions outlined in the theory, we examine the behavior of professional tennis players in 615 international tournaments on the ATP World Tour between January 2001 and June 2010. The data, available at http://www.tennis-data.co.uk, include game-level scores and player ranks for menís singles matches. All of the tournaments are multi-round, single-elimination events played over several days.
Tournament draws may include 28, 32, 48, 56, 96 or 128 players. Of the 615 events in the data, 432 tournaments consist of Öve rounds of playórounds 1 and 2, quarterÖnals, semiÖnals, and the Önal. Six rounds are played in 129 events. Fifty-four tournaments, including the Grand Slam events, consist of seven rounds of play. Most ATP events are bestof-three sets, while the Grand Slam events are best-of-Öve sets. Depending on the number of competitors, Örst-round byes may be awarded to the top-ranked players. 16 World rankings are based on points that players accumulate over the previous 12 months. ATP points directly reáect the pyramid structure of tournaments; more points are awarded to players who advance in top tournaments. For example, a Grand Slam winner earns the maximum points awarded for a single event. 17 ATP rankings are simply a rank-order of all players by their accumulated points. In our analysis, we use the ATP rankings as a measure of playersí skill levels. Table 1 presents summary statistics from 25,758 menís professional tennis matches, reported separately for Öve-, six-and seven-round events. The stronger player wins approximately 65% of the matches; on average, betting markets predict this outcome in approximately the same proportion. On average, matches are decided after approximately 17 games in Öve-and six-round tournaments and 28 games in seven-round tournaments, many of which are decided by best-of-Öve sets.
Results
In this section, we present empirical tests of the theory predictions. We Örst examine performance data from professional tennis matches, reporting empirical evidence of both spillover and shadow e §ects. Next, we ask whether shadow and spillover e §ects have been priced into betting markets. Although this additional analysis is not a direct test of the theory, it does provide further support for the importance of understanding these phenomena.
Spillover and Shadow E §ects in Match Outcomes
Proposition 1 states that tougher future competition will decrease the stronger competitorís probability of success in the current stage. This prediction follows from the observation that while stronger future competition will cause both players to decrease their e §ort in the current period, the current e §ort of the better-ranked player decreases more than the current e §ort of his worse-ranked opponent. Proposition 2 considers the role of spillover in e §ort choice and predicts that negative spillover favors the weaker player. The direction of the spillover e §ect is often an empirical question; however, one might expect negative spillover in events that require intense e §ort exertion over a short period of time. In professional tennis, players may face a higher cost of e §ort if exertion in previous matches induced lasting fatigue.
The following speciÖcation allows us to study the e §ects of shadow and spillover simultaneously:
Strongwins mrs = = 0 + = 1 F uture mrs + = 2 StrongP astGames mrs (11)
where Strongwins mrs is a binary indicator of whether the better-ranked player in match m won in round r of tournament s; F uture mrs represents the expected ability of the opponent in the next round, measured by the rank of the stronger of the possible opponents in the next round 18 ; Current mrs represents the degree of heterogeneity in playersí skills in the current match, measured by the ratio of the ranks of the worse player and the better player;
StrongP astGames mrs is the number of games played in all previous rounds of the tournament by the better-ranked player; W eakP astGames mrs is the number of games played in all previous rounds of the tournament by the worse-ranked player; X r is a matrix of round Öxed e §ects (e.g. Örst, second, quarterÖnal); Z s is a matrix of tournament-year Öxed e §ects (e.g. 2008 U.S. Open) that capture average event-speciÖc di §erences (e.g. temperature, purse and media attention), and " mrs is the error term. We estimate all equations using a linear probability model (OLS) with a robust variance estimator that is clustered at the tournament-year level to account for correlation in playersí performances across matches in a given tournament in a given year. Results are very similar for a probit speciÖcation and are available from the authors by request.
We report results for regression (11) by tournament size, separating Öve-, six-and sevenround events. This accounts for di §erences in tournament structuresófor example, the quarterÖnal competitor casts a shadow on the second round in a Öve-round tournament and the fourth round of a seven-round event; and accumulated spillover in a quarterÖnal match in a Öve-round event may have a considerably di §erent e §ect than in a seven-round event. We exclude Önal-round matches and set the number of previous games for the stronger and weaker players to zero for the Örst round of all tournaments. Table 2 presents results for the main speciÖcation for Öve-, six-and seven-round events. The coe¢cient on the shadow (F uture mrs ) is positive and statistically signiÖcant in all three regressions (p < 0:01). This suggests that the stronger (i.e. better ranked) the future opponent, the lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current round. For a one standard-deviation decrease in future opponentís rank (i.e. increase in ability), we estimate that the probability that the stronger player wins in the current round decreases by approximately 3.2 to 5.7 percentage points, depending on the tournament size. Given that the probability that the stronger player wins is approximately 65%, on average, a one-standard deviation increase in the shadow is associated with a 3 to 8% decline in the probability of winning.
Results: Match Outcomes
Coe¢cient estimates for the two spillover variables take on predicted signs and are statistically signiÖcant in all cases (p < 0:01). More previous games for the stronger player decreases the probability he wins in the current match, while more previous games for the weaker player increases the chance that the stronger player wins. A one standard-deviation increase in the number of previous games for the stronger player is associated with a decline of approximately 7 to 13 percentage points in his probability of winning in the current match; this represents a 10 to 20% decline. A one standard-deviation increase in the number of previous games for the weaker player is associated with a decline of approximately 4 to 7 percentage points in his probability of winning in the current match; this represents a 6 to 11% decline in the probability that the weaker player wins.
The history of the stronger player appears to drive his current success more than the history of his opponentócoe¢cient estimates on the number of games played by the stronger player are larger in magnitude than the coe¢cient estimates for the weaker player, although the magnitudes are signiÖcantly di §erent only for the seven-round tournament (p < 0:01). This Önding is not surprising, in light of the theory. Exertion from past rounds increases the marginal cost of e §ort for both players; however, a common proportional increase in marginal cost leads to a larger change in e §ort for the stronger player, pushing players to provide more similar levels of e §ort. This reduces the probability that the stronger player wins in the current stage.
As expected, the coe¢cient estimates on the skill disparity measure for the current match are all positive and statistically signiÖcant (p < 0:01). This suggests that increased player heterogeneity increases the probability that the stronger player wins. On average, a onestandard deviation increase in the rank ratioóan increase in the disparity between playersí abilitiesóimproves the probability that the stronger player wins by approximately 4 percentage points.
Alternative SpeciÖcations

Tournament Stakes
Shadow and spillover results are robust to di §erent tournament-level controls. Replacing the tournament Öxed e §ects in our main speciÖcation with more detailed controls for the court type, surface type and the natural log of the total tournament purse (in 2010 US dollars) yields shadow and spillover e §ects similar to those presented in Table 2 . Results are presented in Table 3 .
Although not the focus of our current paper, this robustness exercise also allows us to assess whether the stronger player is more likely to win in higher stakes eventsóa prediction that follows from the theory, if increases in the total purse do not materially change the shape of the distribution of prizes. In Table 3 , the coe¢cient estimates on the total prize are positive and statistically signiÖcant, consistent with the prediction that larger prizes increase the probability that the stronger player wins (p < 0:01).
Long Shadow
Motivated by the simple two-stage model in Section 1, the main empirical speciÖcation in Table 2 considers the impact of the expected opponent in the next round of the tournament. It is possible, however, that players respond to a ìlongerî shadowóin principle, players could look at the full tournament roster and adjust their e §ort in response to the overall presence of a very highly skilled player in the event. For example, these e §ort adjustments could take the form of changes in physically and mentally costly training activities for an upcoming tournament. To consider this possibility empirically, we expand the main speciÖcation to include the ATP rank of the most able opponent in the tournament. 19 Results are reported in Table 3 . In all cases, the coe¢cient estimates for the rank of the most able opponent in the tournament are positive and statistically signiÖcant (p < 0:01). That is, the presence of a strong player in the tournamentónot necessarily even in the next immediate roundsómay lower the probability that the stronger player wins in the current match. The coe¢cient estimates associated with the more immediate shadow e §ect are similar to those in the main speciÖcation and remain statistically signiÖcant (p < 0:01). Both the short and long shadows cast by skilled competitors a §ect the probability that the stronger player wins in the current round.
Shadow and Spillover E §ects in Betting Markets
In this section, we explore whether markets account for the shadow and spillover dynamics of multi-stage competition. Indeed, using data from professional betting markets, we Önd compelling evidence that subtle spillover and shadow e §ects have been incorporated into prices.
The e¢ciency of prediction and betting markets has been studied extensively in the literature; for examples, see the survey by Vaughan Williams (1999) . Prediction markets are founded on the argument that by aggregating information, competitive markets should result in prices that reáect all available information (Fama 1970) . Therefore, driven by aggregated information and expectations, prediction market prices may o §er good forecasts of actual outcomes (Spann and Skeira 2003) .
Similarly, betting odds reáect bookmakersí predictions of future outcomes. Betting odds may change as new information becomes available to the bookmaker and with changes in the volume of bets that may be driven by individual bettorsí private information. As with formal prediction markets, we might expect betting odds to provide good forecasts. Spann and Skeira (2008) compare forecasts from prediction markets and betting odds using data for German premier soccer league matches. They Önd that prediction markets and betting odds provide equally accurate forecasts.
To examine whether betting markets incorporate information about shadow and spillover e §ects, we estimate a regression similar to equation (11) : Now, instead of a binary indicator of the actual outcome, the dependent variable is the probability that the stronger player wins the match as implied by betting markets.
Our data include closing odds from professional bookmakers for pre-match betting. 20 Woodland and Woodland (1999) note that bookmakers adjust odds based on the volume of bets, making the odds available as the betting market closes particularly rich in information. In our analysis, we use the median of the available odds data since the data from no single Örm covered all matches. 21 Overall, there was little variation between odds posted by di §erent bookmakers for the same match, perhaps because participants in tennis betting markets tend to be specialists and there is little casual betting (Forrest and McHale 2007) . Table 1 reports the implied probabilities that the stronger player wins across rounds in Öve-, six-and seven-round tournaments. On average, the stronger player is predicted to win; the betting market favors the stronger player approximately 63% of the time, with slightly more favorable predictions in high-stakes, seven-round tournaments. The accuracy of odds market predictions suggests that information beyond simple rankings are being priced into the market. Between 2001 and 2010, predictions from the market are correct for 69% of the 25,633 matches for which betting data are available. Given that the stronger player actually wins in 65% of the matches, one might not be surprised by this accuracy if the market always predicted that the better-ranked player wins. However, in 19% of the matches, the betting odds imply that the weaker player is expected to win. Interestingly, these market predictions are accurate nearly 63% of the time. That is, betting markets do almost as well predicting an upset as they do predicting a win by the stronger player. This is particularly notable since a naive assessment of the ATP rankings in these matches might suggest that the odds are still solidly against the weaker player; in predicted upsets, the mean rank of the weaker player is 98, roughly 1.7 times higher than his opponentís rank of 59. Table 4 reports results for regressions where the dependent variable is the probability that the stronger player wins as implied by the betting market. Overall, coe¢cient estimates suggest that the betting predictions incorporate information about playersí past, current, and expected future competition.
Results: Betting Market Predictions
Coe¢cient estimates for the e §ect of a stronger future opponent are positive and statistically signiÖcant for the three regressions (p < 0:01). For a one standard-deviation decrease in future opponentís rank (increase in ability), we estimate that the implied probability that the stronger player wins in the current round decreases by approximately 1.1 to 3.2 percentage points; this represents a roughly 3% decline in the implied probability of winning.
Since betting markets close at the start of the match, playersí past exertion information is readily available to bookmakers. Indeed, coe¢cient estimates for the stronger and weaker playersí number of previous games are statistically signiÖcant and take on the expected signs all cases (p < 0:01 in 5 of 6 cases; p < 0:1 in 1 of 6). More previous games played by the stronger player is associated with a decrease in the expectation that he succeeds, while more previous games played by the weaker player is associated with an increase in the expectation that the stronger player wins. The magnitudes of these e §ects also align (decimal odds -1) :
with predictions from our modelóstronger players are more sensitive to an additional unit of spillover, compared to the weaker players.
Greater heterogeneity in playersí abilities may increase the marketís expectation that the stronger player winsóthe coe¢cient on rank ratio is positive and statistically signiÖcant in all cases (p < 0:01).
Overall, we Önd strong evidence that prices in tennis betting markets reáect the shadow and spillover e §ects predicted by our model.
Unobserved Player Heterogeneity Across Rounds
One advantage of the betting market data is that we can identify things that might otherwise be outside of the econometricianís observation. In particular, we can identify when there is a predicted upsetóthis prediction is based on observations of the bookmaker and not simply the ranks of the players. For example, if a player has a minor injury or seems to be in the midst of a short winning streak, his world rank would not reáect this transient state. However, bookmakers could integrate this information into their predictions about match outcomes.
We can identify predicted upsets by comparing the implied probability of the betting odds to the rank-based outcome prediction (i.e. the prediction that the stronger player is more likely to win). If the betting odds predict that the worse-ranked player has a better than 50% chance of winning, then there is some unobserved (to us) positive shock for him (and/or negative shock for the stronger player). Deviations from the ranked-based predictions that persist over multiple rounds suggest a state-dependent component of play.
We take a conservative approach to identify this state-dependence.
There are 2085 predicted upsets in the data, representing roughly 7% of all matches. In 67 cases, a single player was predicted to cause multiple upsets in the same event. Fiftyseven of these instances involved two upsets in the same tournament; ten cases involved three predicted upsets. This means that more than 96% of predicted upsets did not persist beyond a single round. Overall, we Önd little evidence that match outcomes are driven by unobserved state dependence.
The role of ATPís seeding rules
One might be concerned that ATP seeding rules introduce a mechanical relationship in the dataówhile seeded and unseeded players are randomly matched in the Örst round, the identity of potential opponents in the future rounds can be constrained by the initial draw. To understand the roles of ATPís seeding protocol, we undertook several simulation exercises and conclude that mechanical relationships are not driving our empirical results.
First, we simulate an initial draw for a 32-player tournament using ATP seeding rules. We then simulate match outcomes probabilistically. SpeciÖcally, the stronger player wins if: 61:7 + 0:379
where Rank strong and Rank weak are the tournament ranks (i.e. values 1 to 32) of the stronger and weaker players in the match, respectively, and x is a random draw from a uniform distribution with support 0 to 100. 22 Otherwise, the weaker player wins. The parameters used in expression (12) are obtained from a regression of an indicator of whether the betterranked player won on a constant and the ratio of the playersí ranks, using the main ATP dataset for the Örst round of Öve-round events. With our simulated draws and results, we can estimate the following regression using a linear probability model:
where Strongwins m is a binary indicator of whether the better-ranked player in match m won in a stated round of a tournament and F uture m represents the ability of the stronger opponent in the next round, as determined by the initial simulated draw. Note that it is not necessary to include tournament Öxed e §ects because the tournaments are identical in all respects except draws and outcomes.
Concerned with a potential mechanical shadow e §ect caused by tournament seeding, we focus our attention on the magnitude and statistical signiÖcance of F 1 : We adapt the simulation procedure to generate second and quarterÖnal data, advancing players according to the simulated outcomes.
Simulation Results
With the simulation data, we can test whether there is a mechanical relationship between the expected ability of the opponent in the next round and the stronger playerís success in the current round. Results in Table 5 show that when we include all Örst rounds matches, there is a small, positive and statistically signiÖcant relationship between the indicator that the stronger player wins and the skill of the expected future opponent. This suggests that we could be overestimating the magnitude of the shadow e §ect in the Örst round. However, this relationship does not appear in later rounds, relieving concerns of a pervasive mechanical e §ect.
One solution that we propose is to drop matches that include the top two seeds of the tournament, at least in the Örst roundórecall that the top two seeds are the only players who are not randomly assigned to a position in the draw. The results from regressions using simulation data are reassuring. Without the top two seeds, we now do not observe any statistically signiÖcant relationship between the indicator that the stronger player wins and the skill of the expected future opponent in any round. That is, we do not observe any mechanical relationship that could be driving our empirical results.
ATP and betting market results excluding the top two seeds
In light of the simulation results, we estimated the main speciÖcation using the ATP dataset and excluding matches with the top two seeded players; results are presented in Table  6 . Coe¢cient estimates in these speciÖcations are very similar in magnitude to those in the main speciÖcation and are identical to the main results in terms the pattern of statistical signiÖcance. That is, the shadow e §ect survives dropping the top seeded players from the analysis and the observed e §ect does not appear to be driven by the ATPís seeding protocol.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a two-stage, match-pair tournament model that provides two sharp results: (a) a shadow e §ect of future competitionóthe tougher the expected competitor in the Önal stage, the lower the probability that the stronger player is selected as the winner in the Örst match; (b) an e §ort spillover e §ectónegative spillover has a stronger adverse e §ect on the higher-skilled player, relative to its impact on the weaker playerís probability of success.
We test our two main theoretical hypotheses using data from professional tennis matches. We Önd evidence of a substantial shadow e §ect and also identify a negative spillover e §ect in tennis tournaments. In a second analysis, we use probability odds data from bookmakers to show that betting markets recognize and price in these spillover and shadow e §ects.
Our Öndings have implications in terms of the structure of elimination tournaments. Tournaments are often designed to identify high-ability candidates in environments where the contest organizer cannot readily observe innate talent. In a Örm context, our results suggest ways by which a manager can improve the likelihood of promoting the strongest candidate.
Shrouding the skill of a strong future opponent increases playersí continuation values, relative to the case where the player faces a stronger rival with certainty. This will elicit more e §ort, particularly from the stronger player, and improve the probability that the stronger player will win in the current match. Of course, the opposite is true if the contest designer shrouds the identity of a weaker future opponent. Overall, a shrouding policy could elicit more e §ort (and thus improve the likelihood of selecting a strong winner) in a setting where the future opponent is more likely to be strong, rather than weak. In promotion contests within the Örm, a manager who suspects his workers will face a particularly highskilled competitor should be discouraged from posting explicit information about the skill and identity of this future threat. In practice, a credible shrouding policy could be implemented by always delaying the announcement of winners from parallel competitions.
Limiting negative spillover by allowing competitors opportunities to refresh their resources between stages may also increase the probability that the stronger type wins. For example, in an innovation contest, Örms should be given adequate time between stages to raise additional funds and pursue more advanced technology improvements. Similarly, a Örm may wish to institute a ìwork-life balanceî program that promotes employee wellness, discourages career-related burnout, and improves the probability that the Örmís labor tournament promotes the strongest workers.
In addition, Örms may want to encourage positive spillover through learning. For example, managers could analyze and provide constructive feedback about workersí performances, allowing them to better accumulate skills over stages of the promotion tournament. Stronger player wins in current match (0% or 100%) Table 3 
-Alternative specifications
Notes: Values in parentheses are robust standard errors, clustered by tournament-year (e.g. 2008 U.S Open). Matches from the final round of all tournaments are excluded. The number of previous games for the stronger and weaker players is set to zero for the first round of all tournaments. "Rank of the best player" generally equals the rank of the best player in the tournament; for matches involving the best-ranked player, this variable equals is the rank of the second best competitor in the event. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
Fixed effects
Round X X X X X X Tournament-Year X X X X X X R-squared 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.10 0.11 0.12 # of observations 10,339 5,781 5,706 9,898 5,621 5,571
Stronger player wins in current match (0% or 100%) Implied probability that the stronger player wins in current period (%) 
